Nomura has cut approximately 50 staff in its investment banking division (IBD) across non-Japan Asia, in what one source says is a rationalisation move following the integration with Lehman Brothers, the former US investment bank, in 2008. The cuts were reportedly across the board in terms of front office versus support functions, as well as in terms of seniority.
"No one was protected," says the source. There are no details of how the layoffs were split between Nomura and ex-Lehman bankers. The source adds that Nomura now has 150-200 investment bankers in Asia ex-Japan, which puts it on a par with its rivals in an environment suffering from reduced deal flow.
One Nomura banker says that the cuts amounted to 'no more than a trim', compared to the enormous staff cuts announced this week by UBS. The Swiss bank is cutting 8,700 jobs globally by 2010. Nomura is doing well in mergers and acquisitions in Asia ex-Japan, lying second on the league table year-to-date, but has a much weaker showing in debt and equity underwriting.
Meanwhile, Bank of America-Merrill Lynch announced via an internal memo on Thursday the appointment of Takefumi Goto to the position of director and head of Japan yen flow sales, reporting to Hideo Misawa. Goto joins the bank's FICC (fixed income, currencies and commodities) team from Morgan Stanley Japan where he worked in the yen interest rates sales group. He is a 16-year veteran of the Japanese fixed-income market.
BOA-ML also announced that Hiroyuki Uchiyama is joining as a director and head of multi-strategy sales, reporting to Michael Halloran, who is co-head of Asia-Pacific global markets. Uchiyama comes from Goldman Sachs Japan, where he handled hedge fund sales. He began his career at Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi.
Finally, Hiroyuki Kitakata joins BOA-ML as a director and head of commodity solutions in Japan, reporting locally to Halloran and regionally to Diego Parrilla, head of Asia-Pacific commodities. Kitakata joins from Deutsche Securities. Kitakata started his career at Bank of Tokyo, subsequently known as Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi.
Tsukasa Noda, a spokesman for BOA-ML in Tokyo, confirmed the moves.
Bankers say that there is a sense that markets are picking up both in Japan and the rest of Asia.
2009年4月16日星期四
2009年4月15日星期三
TCI’s John Ho Said to Leave U.K. Fund for New Venture
John Ho, Asia chief of The Children’s Investment Fund Management UK LLP, will leave the hedge fund after disagreement with the firm’s founder on the investment strategy in the region, according to a person familiar with the matter.
Ho plans to start a new fund focused on Asian equities, the person said, declining to be identified because the information is not public. Ho joined the London-based fund, known as TCI, in 2004 and opened the Hong Kong office after working for Chicago- based Citadel Investments Group LLC. Ho, 32, declined to comment when contacted by phone.
Ho’s departure follows that of co-founders Snehal Amin and Patrick Degorce, who left the firm this year. Christopher Cooper-Hohn remains the only founding partner at the $9.5 billion hedge fund. At least 11 executives have resigned from TCI since the fund started in 2003, according to U.K. filings.
Returns by TCI, which gives a portion of its profits to children’s charities, fell 43 percent in 2008. It had average gains of 42 percent a year from 2003 to 2007. TCI spokesman Rahul Moodgal in London couldn’t immediately be reached.
TCI focuses its investments on infrastructure assets such as airports, ports and utility firms. The fund makes long-term investments, tying up clients’ capital for three to five years while TCI builds relationships with management.
Proxy Battle
Ho made a name for himself in Japan last year when TCI sought a number of changes at the Japanese utility Electric Power Development Co., including doubling dividends. The fund sold its 9.9 percent stake back to the utility, known as J-Power, for 63.2 billion yen ($640 million) in October, after losing a proxy battle in June.
TCI’s request to double its stake in J-Power was seen as a litmus test for Japan’s openness to foreign investments that touch on national security. The Japanese government blocked TCI’s purchase on national-security grounds, invoking for the first time a Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law.
TCI has held about $1.1 billion worth of short positions this year in 13 Japanese stocks, including Toshiba Corp. and Mizuho Financial Group Inc., data based on exchange filings compiled by Bloomberg show.
Elsewhere in Asia, TCI has made investments in Link Real Estate Investment Trust, Hong Kong’s biggest property trust. Ho was appointed a non-executive director in July 2006 as part of the fund’s efforts to boost monitoring as a shareholder. TCI is pushing for the trust to accelerate rent increases to boost returns from a property boom in the city.
Short Squeeze
In an appearance before a U.K. House of Commons committee meeting on Jan. 27, Cooper-Hohn said hedge funds like his didn’t profit from stock-market declines.
“It has been obvious from industry figures that all Asia, not just Japan, has been difficult for hedge funds to make money,” said Scott McGlashan, a London-based fund manager who oversees Japanese stocks at J.O. Hambro Capital Management Ltd. “If hedge funds withdraw, shorts will be squeezed and markets could go higher.”
Hedge funds had their worst year in two decades, dropping an average 19 percent in 2008, according to data compiled by Chicago-based Hedge Fund Research Inc.
Ho plans to start a new fund focused on Asian equities, the person said, declining to be identified because the information is not public. Ho joined the London-based fund, known as TCI, in 2004 and opened the Hong Kong office after working for Chicago- based Citadel Investments Group LLC. Ho, 32, declined to comment when contacted by phone.
Ho’s departure follows that of co-founders Snehal Amin and Patrick Degorce, who left the firm this year. Christopher Cooper-Hohn remains the only founding partner at the $9.5 billion hedge fund. At least 11 executives have resigned from TCI since the fund started in 2003, according to U.K. filings.
Returns by TCI, which gives a portion of its profits to children’s charities, fell 43 percent in 2008. It had average gains of 42 percent a year from 2003 to 2007. TCI spokesman Rahul Moodgal in London couldn’t immediately be reached.
TCI focuses its investments on infrastructure assets such as airports, ports and utility firms. The fund makes long-term investments, tying up clients’ capital for three to five years while TCI builds relationships with management.
Proxy Battle
Ho made a name for himself in Japan last year when TCI sought a number of changes at the Japanese utility Electric Power Development Co., including doubling dividends. The fund sold its 9.9 percent stake back to the utility, known as J-Power, for 63.2 billion yen ($640 million) in October, after losing a proxy battle in June.
TCI’s request to double its stake in J-Power was seen as a litmus test for Japan’s openness to foreign investments that touch on national security. The Japanese government blocked TCI’s purchase on national-security grounds, invoking for the first time a Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law.
TCI has held about $1.1 billion worth of short positions this year in 13 Japanese stocks, including Toshiba Corp. and Mizuho Financial Group Inc., data based on exchange filings compiled by Bloomberg show.
Elsewhere in Asia, TCI has made investments in Link Real Estate Investment Trust, Hong Kong’s biggest property trust. Ho was appointed a non-executive director in July 2006 as part of the fund’s efforts to boost monitoring as a shareholder. TCI is pushing for the trust to accelerate rent increases to boost returns from a property boom in the city.
Short Squeeze
In an appearance before a U.K. House of Commons committee meeting on Jan. 27, Cooper-Hohn said hedge funds like his didn’t profit from stock-market declines.
“It has been obvious from industry figures that all Asia, not just Japan, has been difficult for hedge funds to make money,” said Scott McGlashan, a London-based fund manager who oversees Japanese stocks at J.O. Hambro Capital Management Ltd. “If hedge funds withdraw, shorts will be squeezed and markets could go higher.”
Hedge funds had their worst year in two decades, dropping an average 19 percent in 2008, according to data compiled by Chicago-based Hedge Fund Research Inc.
Denise Hu and Rockhampton combine for new Asia fund
Denise Hu, who until recently was a portfolio manager at Hong Kong-based fund of hedge funds Sail Advisors, has reappeared with news that she will start a new fund of hedge funds vehicle.She will combine with hedge fund manager Rockhampton Management, which runs a number of Japan hedge funds, including the eponymous Rockhampton Fund, the Yaraka Fund and Longreach Fund. Rockhampton will provide Hu with seeding and working capital. The initial capital of the launch will constitute internal sources, including Rockhampton staff money. Rockhampton says it has confidence in the new team and believes it will be an attractive avenue for partners and staff to diversify their personal capital.At a later date, the plan is to open the fund to third-party investors. Registration with the SFC is also being undertaken under the Rockhampton auspices. Nonetheless, in order to prevent any conflict of interest, Chinese walls are in place between the hedge fund and the fund of funds business. Hu has already kicked off operations and will be joined by a team of three in the next few months, and is currently in the process of appointing lawyers and fund administrators.Before her spell at Sail Advisors, where she was responsible for the pan-Asia portfolios, Hu worked as a derivatives strategist at Merrill Lynch Asia-Pacific.
2009年4月14日星期二
CLSA Plans to Raise Up to $500 Million for Japan Fund
CLSA Capital Partners plans to raise as much as $500 million for a buyout fund to invest in Japanese companies that have strong domestic demand and potential to expand in new markets such as China.
The fund will start within two months and buy stakes in seven to eight mid-sized companies worth about 5 billion yen ($50 million) to 30 billion yen each, Managing Director Megumi Kiyozuka said in an interview in Tokyo on April 10. The fund will be housed in the alternative asset management arm of CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets, which has $2.5 billion in assets.
“We’re seeing attractive valuations across the board now,” said Kiyozuka, 47, who worked at Carlyle Group before joining Hong Kong-based CLSA Capital in 2006. “We’re also seeing less competition in the private equity market now, and that’s an edge for us with the focus we have on Japan.”
The Topix index of 1,706 companies slumped 32 percent during the past year, making targets cheaper for buyout funds. The credit crunch has also made it harder for them to raise money, with private equity funds attracting $46 billion in capital in the three months through March, the worst quarter in six years, according to London-based research firm Preqin.
The fund, which has yet to be named, follows the 2006 launch of CLSA Sunrise Capital, which also focuses on Japan and has invested in companies ranging from clothing maker Baroque Japan Ltd. to Everlife Co., a health-care firm based in Fukuoka prefecture.
Baroque, Everlife
CLSA Sunrise helped Tokyo-based Baroque -- known for its “moussy” brand targeting women in their teens and 20s -- through a management buyout in September 2007 and is now guiding its expansion plans in China and preparations to list on the stock exchange. It is also helping Everlife with listing plans and growth in China.
Companies unable to raise funds through stock exchange listings -- which dropped to the lowest in Japan since 1992 last year, according to data compiled by Bloomberg -- may turn to private equity investors instead.
Announced private equity transactions in Japan in 2008 totaled $8.1 billion, compared with $6.8 billion a year earlier, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Carlyle Group, the world’s second-largest private equity firm, was involved in only one transaction in 2008, while Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., the New York-based buyout firm, had none, according to spokespeople for the firms.
More than 1,670 private equity funds are currently seeking $887 billion from investors, Preqin said in a report on April 1. The funds are taking longer to sign up investors and at least nine scrapped fund-raisings in 2009, it said.
“We see value in deals that we get through our network and connections,” Kiyozuka said. “Private equity firms should work behind the scenes in turning businesses around, and investors who understand that concept are still out there to provide funds.”
The fund will start within two months and buy stakes in seven to eight mid-sized companies worth about 5 billion yen ($50 million) to 30 billion yen each, Managing Director Megumi Kiyozuka said in an interview in Tokyo on April 10. The fund will be housed in the alternative asset management arm of CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets, which has $2.5 billion in assets.
“We’re seeing attractive valuations across the board now,” said Kiyozuka, 47, who worked at Carlyle Group before joining Hong Kong-based CLSA Capital in 2006. “We’re also seeing less competition in the private equity market now, and that’s an edge for us with the focus we have on Japan.”
The Topix index of 1,706 companies slumped 32 percent during the past year, making targets cheaper for buyout funds. The credit crunch has also made it harder for them to raise money, with private equity funds attracting $46 billion in capital in the three months through March, the worst quarter in six years, according to London-based research firm Preqin.
The fund, which has yet to be named, follows the 2006 launch of CLSA Sunrise Capital, which also focuses on Japan and has invested in companies ranging from clothing maker Baroque Japan Ltd. to Everlife Co., a health-care firm based in Fukuoka prefecture.
Baroque, Everlife
CLSA Sunrise helped Tokyo-based Baroque -- known for its “moussy” brand targeting women in their teens and 20s -- through a management buyout in September 2007 and is now guiding its expansion plans in China and preparations to list on the stock exchange. It is also helping Everlife with listing plans and growth in China.
Companies unable to raise funds through stock exchange listings -- which dropped to the lowest in Japan since 1992 last year, according to data compiled by Bloomberg -- may turn to private equity investors instead.
Announced private equity transactions in Japan in 2008 totaled $8.1 billion, compared with $6.8 billion a year earlier, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Carlyle Group, the world’s second-largest private equity firm, was involved in only one transaction in 2008, while Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., the New York-based buyout firm, had none, according to spokespeople for the firms.
More than 1,670 private equity funds are currently seeking $887 billion from investors, Preqin said in a report on April 1. The funds are taking longer to sign up investors and at least nine scrapped fund-raisings in 2009, it said.
“We see value in deals that we get through our network and connections,” Kiyozuka said. “Private equity firms should work behind the scenes in turning businesses around, and investors who understand that concept are still out there to provide funds.”
2009年4月7日星期二
Could China become another Japan?
China's decision not to allow Coca Cola to buy local soft drinks champion Huiyuan Juice, announced on March 18, and the latest World Bank report predicting growth will slow to 6.5% from the previously forecast 7.5%, has caused some commentators to wonder whether China could turn inwards. The fear is that China could turn away from its relatively open economic model and copy Japan's 'mercantilist' model, defined as manipulating the terms of trade in one's favour through currency depreciation and non-tariff barriers to imports and investments, and thus 'stealing' growth from one's neighbours.
Japan has a total trade-to-GDP ratio of just 18%, and the stock of foreign direct investment represents a truly lamentable 1%. With only 2 million registered foreigners, Japan is the least welcoming country in the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), with a ratio of 1.5% foreigners to the total population. Compare that to 10% in Spain, or even Germany, which has 16 million foreign residents in a population of 85 million.
China is far more open, with FDI accounting for 4% of GDP and 10% of capital formation in 2008. Total trade accounts for 35% of GDP. Foreign firms exporting out of China account for almost 50% of total exports -- probably a unique ratio in world history. China also has huge imports, meaning the net contribution of trade to GDP is much smaller. But China is clearly an important cog in the global production chain. Japan, despite its well-known brands, is not. Indeed, Toyota pretty much sums up the significance of Japanese exports. (Cars are Japan's most important export component, and within that, Toyota is the most important company.)
Tomas Casas i Klett, co-author of the excellent new book Japan's Open Future warns: "The world can digest one mercantilist super economy, but not two." This comment refers to what Casas i Klett believes is the defining characteristic of Japanese economic history, namely the accumulation of trade surpluses with the rest of the world. His concern is that in a time of crisis, China could follow Japan's lead in turning away from mutually enhancing growth, as Japan did in the 1930s and surprisingly, even today, as reflected in the figures above. The effect would be a series of 'beggar thy neighbour' policies through currency depreciations and protectionist methods which could plunge the world into depression, according to one widely held theory.
China already looks somewhat like Japan in its pomp. Just as Japan went through a manically energetic episode after the Second World War, during which people united behind the goal of 'catching up with the West', China in the 1980s turned its back on the ideological rigidities of Maoism. Just as Japan did earlier, China has flourished by creating an enormous amount of manufacturing capacity in order to export to the West. But the pupil has surpassed the master: China's ratio of trade to GDP is 35%, two times that in Japan. Japan seems to be going in the other direction, with its share of the world export market falling from 8.25% in the 1990s, to 5.5% today.
Is Japan still mercantilist if its trade activity is diminishing? Yes, but perhaps an increasingly bad example (which is precisely why Casas i Klett urges opening up the economy). Japan still has huge trade surpluses (but the first current account deficit in 13 years came in January 2009), and exports provide what growth the economy manages to eke out. "Fifty-five percent of GDP comes from private consumption, 15% from exports, but when you look at the growth rate of GDP, which is very marginal, that marginal change can be largely explained by a rise in exports. So it's the change in GDP, not the absolute value of GDP, which is changing," Kenichiro Kawasaki, a former Japan economist at Lehman Brothers, explained to FinanceAsia last year.
Another similarity is excessively depreciated currencies. Japan has achieved that by extraordinarily low interest rates, while China has achieved it through a target level against the dollar.
The end of the bubble in 1989 brought about conflicting responses in Japan. Under Prime Minister Koizumi, the country made some attempts to switch from the state-directed, mercantilist model of economic growth to a more classically liberal one. But Casas i Klett and his co-authors argue (despite cosmetics reform like the privatisation of certain agencies, especially the Post Office) that this has made little real difference: "Japan (today) is closed by any objective criterion one cares to use: level of imports, inward foreign investment, immigration, foreign managers and professionals, foreign brand recognition, penetration of international media, foreign language capability, international standards, contribution to development, extent of political contests inside Japan etcetera."
Actually, during the internet bubble of 2000, a crop of 'new economy' companies did emerge. What is different to the post-War era, which stimulated entrepreneurial giants like Honda and Sony, is that these companies did not become great world-beaters. On the contrary, the internet sector, as reflected by the mother board of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, has never recovered from Takefumi Horie's Livedoor scandal.
The question now is whether China will react in the same way as Japan to an economic catastrophe -- and let us be clear that this does not necessarily imply evil or stupidity. The lesson of the 1930s (as could be repeated today) seemed to be that liberal economies simply did not work, especially when only the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany seemed to have found an economic solution. Recall that pre-war Japan was run in the orthodox liberal manner -- at least until 1931 when the country was forced off the gold standard along with Britain. After 1931, in a bid to solve the banking crises and wealth inequalities that had followed World War I, Japan adopted very illiberal policies. The results were initially good: Japan saw trade growing at a faster rate than GDP in the 1930s. The big difference versus Japan in the post-war era was that these policies did not result in yearly trade surpluses, because of the military's import needs. The state took on even more power in 1938 with a series of laws controlling trade and capital. By then, the country was run on purely ideological (Fascist) lines, rather than purely economic (mercantilist) lines.
Experience teaches us that realistically speaking, it's impossible to maintain a 'business as usual' approach in times of economic crisis, however desirable in principle. Brokerage CLSA has published figures which predict a huge shrinkage in world trade. Unless GDP shrinks to the same extent (a disaster in itself) it's impossible to see China, or any trading country, maintaining its openness in terms of trade-to-GDP ratios.
CLSA's China economist, Andy Rothman, is more bullish than most on China, but apparently only if assuming China becomes less open. Rothman claims that China is far more of a continental economy than generally appreciated, given its low net exports (under 10% of GDP). Thanks to its control of the state banks, the government can force spending to rise on real estate and construction, a sector which is greater than 10% of GDP, and can therefore balance out a collapse in net exports. So problem solved? Kawasaki, quoted above, would not agree. But it would show that China has the ability to crush the vested interest in the export sector for the good of the overall economy. Crushing vested interests in its domestic economy is exactly what Japan has failed to do.
Theoretically, even a successful domestic re-orientation would not prevent an international reduction in living standards, since countries would depart from the theory of comparative advantage. In practice, that theory has been partly discredited, since industrialised countries trade mostly with each other (for example Renault has 10% of the German car market). But new compensating domestic demand must be found -- and here Japan and China are both challenged: Japan by terrible demographics, and in China, by a lack of widespread wealth. In this crisis, there are no easy answers.
Japan has a total trade-to-GDP ratio of just 18%, and the stock of foreign direct investment represents a truly lamentable 1%. With only 2 million registered foreigners, Japan is the least welcoming country in the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), with a ratio of 1.5% foreigners to the total population. Compare that to 10% in Spain, or even Germany, which has 16 million foreign residents in a population of 85 million.
China is far more open, with FDI accounting for 4% of GDP and 10% of capital formation in 2008. Total trade accounts for 35% of GDP. Foreign firms exporting out of China account for almost 50% of total exports -- probably a unique ratio in world history. China also has huge imports, meaning the net contribution of trade to GDP is much smaller. But China is clearly an important cog in the global production chain. Japan, despite its well-known brands, is not. Indeed, Toyota pretty much sums up the significance of Japanese exports. (Cars are Japan's most important export component, and within that, Toyota is the most important company.)
Tomas Casas i Klett, co-author of the excellent new book Japan's Open Future warns: "The world can digest one mercantilist super economy, but not two." This comment refers to what Casas i Klett believes is the defining characteristic of Japanese economic history, namely the accumulation of trade surpluses with the rest of the world. His concern is that in a time of crisis, China could follow Japan's lead in turning away from mutually enhancing growth, as Japan did in the 1930s and surprisingly, even today, as reflected in the figures above. The effect would be a series of 'beggar thy neighbour' policies through currency depreciations and protectionist methods which could plunge the world into depression, according to one widely held theory.
China already looks somewhat like Japan in its pomp. Just as Japan went through a manically energetic episode after the Second World War, during which people united behind the goal of 'catching up with the West', China in the 1980s turned its back on the ideological rigidities of Maoism. Just as Japan did earlier, China has flourished by creating an enormous amount of manufacturing capacity in order to export to the West. But the pupil has surpassed the master: China's ratio of trade to GDP is 35%, two times that in Japan. Japan seems to be going in the other direction, with its share of the world export market falling from 8.25% in the 1990s, to 5.5% today.
Is Japan still mercantilist if its trade activity is diminishing? Yes, but perhaps an increasingly bad example (which is precisely why Casas i Klett urges opening up the economy). Japan still has huge trade surpluses (but the first current account deficit in 13 years came in January 2009), and exports provide what growth the economy manages to eke out. "Fifty-five percent of GDP comes from private consumption, 15% from exports, but when you look at the growth rate of GDP, which is very marginal, that marginal change can be largely explained by a rise in exports. So it's the change in GDP, not the absolute value of GDP, which is changing," Kenichiro Kawasaki, a former Japan economist at Lehman Brothers, explained to FinanceAsia last year.
Another similarity is excessively depreciated currencies. Japan has achieved that by extraordinarily low interest rates, while China has achieved it through a target level against the dollar.
The end of the bubble in 1989 brought about conflicting responses in Japan. Under Prime Minister Koizumi, the country made some attempts to switch from the state-directed, mercantilist model of economic growth to a more classically liberal one. But Casas i Klett and his co-authors argue (despite cosmetics reform like the privatisation of certain agencies, especially the Post Office) that this has made little real difference: "Japan (today) is closed by any objective criterion one cares to use: level of imports, inward foreign investment, immigration, foreign managers and professionals, foreign brand recognition, penetration of international media, foreign language capability, international standards, contribution to development, extent of political contests inside Japan etcetera."
Actually, during the internet bubble of 2000, a crop of 'new economy' companies did emerge. What is different to the post-War era, which stimulated entrepreneurial giants like Honda and Sony, is that these companies did not become great world-beaters. On the contrary, the internet sector, as reflected by the mother board of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, has never recovered from Takefumi Horie's Livedoor scandal.
The question now is whether China will react in the same way as Japan to an economic catastrophe -- and let us be clear that this does not necessarily imply evil or stupidity. The lesson of the 1930s (as could be repeated today) seemed to be that liberal economies simply did not work, especially when only the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany seemed to have found an economic solution. Recall that pre-war Japan was run in the orthodox liberal manner -- at least until 1931 when the country was forced off the gold standard along with Britain. After 1931, in a bid to solve the banking crises and wealth inequalities that had followed World War I, Japan adopted very illiberal policies. The results were initially good: Japan saw trade growing at a faster rate than GDP in the 1930s. The big difference versus Japan in the post-war era was that these policies did not result in yearly trade surpluses, because of the military's import needs. The state took on even more power in 1938 with a series of laws controlling trade and capital. By then, the country was run on purely ideological (Fascist) lines, rather than purely economic (mercantilist) lines.
Experience teaches us that realistically speaking, it's impossible to maintain a 'business as usual' approach in times of economic crisis, however desirable in principle. Brokerage CLSA has published figures which predict a huge shrinkage in world trade. Unless GDP shrinks to the same extent (a disaster in itself) it's impossible to see China, or any trading country, maintaining its openness in terms of trade-to-GDP ratios.
CLSA's China economist, Andy Rothman, is more bullish than most on China, but apparently only if assuming China becomes less open. Rothman claims that China is far more of a continental economy than generally appreciated, given its low net exports (under 10% of GDP). Thanks to its control of the state banks, the government can force spending to rise on real estate and construction, a sector which is greater than 10% of GDP, and can therefore balance out a collapse in net exports. So problem solved? Kawasaki, quoted above, would not agree. But it would show that China has the ability to crush the vested interest in the export sector for the good of the overall economy. Crushing vested interests in its domestic economy is exactly what Japan has failed to do.
Theoretically, even a successful domestic re-orientation would not prevent an international reduction in living standards, since countries would depart from the theory of comparative advantage. In practice, that theory has been partly discredited, since industrialised countries trade mostly with each other (for example Renault has 10% of the German car market). But new compensating domestic demand must be found -- and here Japan and China are both challenged: Japan by terrible demographics, and in China, by a lack of widespread wealth. In this crisis, there are no easy answers.
2009年3月30日星期一
ジャパン2009 AVCJ プライベート・エクイティ&ベンチャー・フォーラム
皆様
今年も４月６日から４月８日までコンラッド東京にて開催のプライベート・エクイティー・フォーラムには、日本のPE業界で活躍する数々のLP、ファンドマネジャー、シニアプロフェッショナル、企業家の方々にご参加いただいています。
基調講演
MARK MOBIUS
Executive Chairman
Templeton Asset Management Ltd
浜辺 哲也
産業資金課長
経済産業省経済産業政策局
イェスパー・コール
President & CEO
Tantallon Research (Japan) KK
浦西 友義
常務執行役員
(株) 東京証券取引所
今年も４月６日から４月８日までコンラッド東京にて開催のプライベート・エクイティー・フォーラムには、日本のPE業界で活躍する数々のLP、ファンドマネジャー、シニアプロフェッショナル、企業家の方々にご参加いただいています。
基調講演
MARK MOBIUS
Executive Chairman
Templeton Asset Management Ltd
浜辺 哲也
産業資金課長
経済産業省経済産業政策局
イェスパー・コール
President & CEO
Tantallon Research (Japan) KK
浦西 友義
常務執行役員
(株) 東京証券取引所
Mitsubishi UFJ Leads Biggest Asia-Pacific Bond Sales
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc.’s bank unit led Asia-Pacific borrowers that sold $176.3 billion of bonds this quarter, the most in at least a decade, as investor demand for investment-grade debt returned.
New issues almost doubled from the same period last year, with Citigroup Inc., HSBC Holdings Plc and Barclays Capital managing a third of all sales in dollars, euros and yen for the region outside Japan, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd. sold 450 billion yen ($4.7 billion) of 2.75 percent notes in Japan’s biggest sale of corporate bonds, while Commonwealth Bank of Australia raised A$2 billion ($1.4 billion) from 4.5 percent, state-backed notes. South Korean steelmaker Posco raised $700 million from the region’s first non-guaranteed corporate dollar sale of the year.
“Most new deals are doing very well and liquidity is coming back,” said Arthur Lau, a Hong Kong-based fund manager with JF Asset Management Ltd., which oversees $128 billion. “Volatility has fallen because many hedge funds, which tend to engage in short-term trading, are being replaced by buy-and-hold, real money accounts such as banks. Fund managers are more than happy to invest in very, very high quality issuers.”
Asian corporate borrowers’ dollar bonds returned 4.4 percent this year after losing 13 percent in 2008, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s Asia Credit Index. Borrowers are tapping demand for corporate debt after yields relative to government bonds fell more than 100 basis points from a record 953 basis points on Oct. 29, according to the Asia Credit Index.
New issues almost doubled from the same period last year, with Citigroup Inc., HSBC Holdings Plc and Barclays Capital managing a third of all sales in dollars, euros and yen for the region outside Japan, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd. sold 450 billion yen ($4.7 billion) of 2.75 percent notes in Japan’s biggest sale of corporate bonds, while Commonwealth Bank of Australia raised A$2 billion ($1.4 billion) from 4.5 percent, state-backed notes. South Korean steelmaker Posco raised $700 million from the region’s first non-guaranteed corporate dollar sale of the year.
“Most new deals are doing very well and liquidity is coming back,” said Arthur Lau, a Hong Kong-based fund manager with JF Asset Management Ltd., which oversees $128 billion. “Volatility has fallen because many hedge funds, which tend to engage in short-term trading, are being replaced by buy-and-hold, real money accounts such as banks. Fund managers are more than happy to invest in very, very high quality issuers.”
Asian corporate borrowers’ dollar bonds returned 4.4 percent this year after losing 13 percent in 2008, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s Asia Credit Index. Borrowers are tapping demand for corporate debt after yields relative to government bonds fell more than 100 basis points from a record 953 basis points on Oct. 29, according to the Asia Credit Index.
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